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Abstract
In this work, we present the integration of the photon
counting technique (PhCT) with an encryption system in the
Gyrator domain (GD) for secure image authentication. The
encryption system uses two random phase masks (RPMs),
one RPM is defined at the spatial domain and the other RPM
is defined at the GD, in order to encode the image to encrypt
(original image) into random noise. The rotation angle of
the Gyrator transform adds a new key that increases the
security of the encryption system. The decryption system
is an inverse system with respect to the encryption system.
The PhCT limits the information content of an image in a
nonlinear, random and controlled way; the photon-limited
image only has a few pixels of information, this type of image
is usually known as sparse image. We apply the PhCT over
the encrypted image. The resulting image in the decryption
system is not a copy of the original image, this decrypted
image is a random code that should contain the sufficient
information for the authentication of the original image
using a nonlinear correlation technique. Finally, we evaluate
the peak-to-correlation energy metric for different values of
the parameters involved in the encryption and authentication
systems, in order to test the verification capability of the
authentication system.
1. Introduction
The photon counting technique (PhCT) allows to con-
trol the information content of an image in a nonlinear and
random form [12, 1]. Recently, the PhCT has been inte-
grated with the double random phase encoding (DRPE) in
the Fourier domain [9, 6], for secure image encryption and
authentication [7, 5, 8]. The PhCT introduces a nonlinearity
into the DRPE system, this nonlinearity increases the secu-
rity of the encryption and authentication systems against to
some attacks [8]. The PhCT can be applied to the original
image or encrypted image. On the one hand, if the PhCT is
applied to the original image, a photon-limited image with
only few pixels is obtained. This image permits to hide the
secret information of the original image from visual inspec-
tion (information hiding) [7]. On the other hand, if the PhCT
is applied to the encrypted image, a sparse encrypted distri-
bution is produced, and a reduction of the transmitted/stored
information is achieved (information compression) [7].
In this work, the integration of the PhTC with the DRPE
in the Gyrator domain (GD) for secure image authentica-
tion is presented. We apply the PhCT over the encrypted
image with the purpose of compressing this image. The
authentication system is based on a nonlinear correlation
technique [2, 3]; in this system the decrypted image is com-
pared with the original image to verify its authenticity. We
show that the peak-to-correlation energy (PCE) [11] is im-
proved for certain values of the rotation angle of the Gyrator
transform (GT) and the nonlinearity applied in the correla-
tion technique, in comparison with the previous results of the
PCE for the integration of the PhTC with the DRPE in the
Fourier domain (FD). This improvement over the PCE metric
allows a better verification capability for the authentication
system.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 and 3 intro-
duce the GT and PhCT, respectively. The integration of the
PhCT with the DRPE in the GD for secure image authentica-
tion is described and illustrated with an example in Section
4. In Section 5, we evaluate and compare the PCE metrics
for the integration of the PhCT with the DRPE in the FD and
GD. Conclusions are outlined in Section 6.
2. Gyrator transform (GT)
The GT is mathematically defined as a linear canonical
integral transform which produces the twisted rotation in
position–spatial frequency planes of phase space [10]. The
GT at parameter α, which is the rotation angle, of a two-
dimensional function f(x, y) can be written in the following
form
fα(u, v) = G
α{f(x, y)}
=
+∞∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
f(x, y)Kα(u, v, x, y)dxdy, (1)
Kα(u, v, x, y) =
ei2pi[(uv+xy) cotα−(vx+uy) cscα]
|sinα| , (2)
α =
ppi
2
, where: 0 ≤ α < 2pi, and 0 ≤ p < 4, (3)
where x and y denote the coordinates at the spatial domain,
u and v indicate the output coordinates in the GD and Kα is
the gyrator kernel. For p = 0 (α = 0), it corresponds to the
identity transform. For p = 1 (α = pi/2), it reduces to the
direct Fourier transform with rotation of the coordinate at
pi/2. For p = 2 (α = pi), the reverse transform is obtained.
For p = 3 (α = 3pi/2), it corresponds to the inverse Fourier
transform with rotation of the coordinate at pi/2. The GT
has a period of 4 with respect to p and 2pi for α. The inverse
GT corresponds to the GT at rotation angle −α. The GT is
additive with respect to the rotation angle, G αG β = G α+β .
3. Photon Counting Technique (PhCT)
We can control the expected number of incident pho-
tons (counts, Np) over a captured image by using the PhCT.
Therefore, in general, a photon-limited image has less infor-
mation than the original counterpart [7]. The probability of
counting lj photons at pixel j can be shown to be Poisson
distributed [12, 1]
Pd(lj ;λj) =
[λj ]
lje−λj
(lj)!
, lj = 0, 1, 2, ..., (4)
where the Poisson parameter λj is given by λj = Npg(xj),
with g(xj) being the normalized irradiance at pixel xj such
that
∑M
j=1 g(xj) = 1 and M equals the total number of
pixels in the image.
The PhCT can be applied to a real-valued image f(x)
or the complex-valued image d(x) [7]. For the case of the
real-valued image f(x), we obtain the photon-limited image
fph(x) when the equation (4) is applied to the normalized
distribution g(x) = f(x)/
∑M
j=1 f(xj).
When the PhCT is applied to the complex-valued im-
age d(x), a photon-limited amplitude information |d(x)|, is
generated from the normalized amplitude image g(x) =
|d(x)|/∑Mj=1|d(xj)| using the equation (4). The pixels
that receive at least one photon count are considered in the
photon-limited encrypted function dph(x). Only these pixels
contain information of the phase of d(x).
4. Integration of the PhCT with the DRPE in
the GD for Secure Image Authentication
We describe the encryption system based on a DRPE
in the GD. Let f(x, y) be the real image to be encrypted
(original image) with values in the interval [0, 1], and r(x, y)
and hα(u, v) be two random phase masks (RPMs) given by
r(x, y) = exp{i2pim(x, y)},
h(u, v) = exp{i2pin(u, v)}, (5)
wherem(x, y) and n(u, v) are normalized positive functions
randomly generated, statistically independent, uniformly
distributed in the interval [0, 1] and defined at the spatial
domain and the GD, respectively. In the first step of the
encryption system, the original image f(x, y) is multiplied
by the RPM r(x, y) and this product is gyrator transformed
with the rotation angle α. The result of the previous GT is
multiplied by the RPM h(u, v) and finally, this last product
is gyrator transformed with the rotation angle −α. The final
encrypted image e(x, y) is a complex-valued image defined
by
e(x, y) = G−α {h(u, v)G α{f(x, y)r(x, y)}} . (6)
The complex-valued encrypted image e(x, y) has amplitude
|e(x, y)| and phase φe(x, y) information, so this image can
be written as e(x, y) = |e(x, y)| exp{iφe(x, y)}. The secu-
rity keys of the encryption system are given by the rotation
angle α of the GT and the RPM h(u, v). These keys will be
required for decryption.
In order to obtain a photon-limited encrypted image
eph(x, y), we applied the PhCT with a number of photon
counts Np over the complex-valued encrypted image e(x, y)
using the procedure described in the section 3.
The decryption system uses the reverse process of the
encryption system. The inputs of the decryption system are:
the photon-limited encrypted image eph(x, y), the rotation
angle α of the GT and the RPM h(u, v). In the first step of
the decryption system, we apply the GT with the rotation
angle α to eph(x, y) and this result is multiplied by the com-
plex conjugate of the RPM h(u, v). The resulting product is
gyrator transforming with the rotation angle −α and finally,
we obtain the decrypted image fph(x, y) when the absolute
value function is applied to the last result of the GT. The
real-valued decrypted image fph(x, y) is given by
fph(x, y) =
∣∣G−α {h∗(u, v)G α{eph(x, y)}}∣∣ , (7)
where the superscript ∗ denotes the complex conjugation
operation.
The digital results of the encryption system, the PhCT and
the decryption system following the steps described above
are illustrated with an example in figure 1. The original
image f(x, y) has 512 × 512 pixels and it is presented in
figure 1(a). The random distribution code m(x, y) of RPM
r(x, y) is shown in figure 1(b). The random code image
n(u, v) of RPM h(u, v) has different values but the same
appearance of the image presented in figure 1(b). The ampli-
tude and phase information of the encrypted image e(x, y)
are depicted in figures 1(c) and 1(d), respectively, for the
rotation angle p = 3/4 (α = 3pi/8). Figure 1(e) shows the
amplitude of the photon-limited encrypted image |eph(x, y)|,
corresponding to figure 1(c) when the total number of photon
counts for the PhCT is set to be Np = 103. The decrypted
image fph(x, y) for all the correct keys (h(u, v) and α) is
shown in figure 1(f). The digital GT was implemented using
the fast algorithm of the discrete GT based on convolution
operation [4].
The encrypted image e(x, y) looks like random noise that
protects the information content of the original image, as can
be seen in figures 1(c) and 1(d). The amplitude of the photon-
limited encrypted image |eph(x, y)| shown in figure 1(e) is
a sparse version of the amplitude encrypted image |e(x, y)|.
The total number of photons in figure 1(e) is Np = 103,
which corresponds to less than 0.4% of the total number of
pixels of the 512×512 original image. The decrypted image
fph(x, y) of figure 1(f) is a random real-valued image that
it is not a copy of the original image. The text contained
in the original image of figure 1(a) cannot be recognized
from the noisy decrypted image fph(x, y) depicted in fig-
ure 1(f). Therefore, the decrypted image fph(x, y) is not
intended for visualization, but it has sufficient information
for authentication [7].
The authentication process of the decrypted image
fph(x, y) compares this image with the original image
f(x, y) utilized as a reference, by using a nonlinear correla-
tion technique [2]. The images to be compared are Fourier
transformed, nonlinearly modified and multiplied in the FD.
By inverse Fourier transforming this product, the nonlinear
correlation c(x, y) between both images is obtained [2]
c(x, y) = F−1
{
F {f(x, y)} [F {fph(x, y)}]∗∣∣F {f(x, y)} ∣∣1−k∣∣F {fph(x, y)} ∣∣1−k
}
,
(8)
where the parameter k defines the strength of the applied
nonlinearity and determines the performance features of the
correlator [2]. The parameter k is defined in the interval
[0, 1].
The intensity output for the nonlinear correlation c(x, y)
with k = 0, between the decrypted image fph(x, y) of fig-
ure 1(f) and the reference original image f(x, y) of fig-
ure 1(a) is presented in figure 2. This result allows the
authentication of the decrypted image fph(x, y) due to the
sharp peak presented in the output correlation c(x, y) over
its noisy background. The maximum correlation value has
been set to unity to make the comparison easier.
(a) f(x, y) (b) m(x, y)
(c) |e(x, y)| (d) φe(x, y)
(e) |eph(x, y)| (f) fph(x, y)
Figure 1. (a) Original image f(x, y) to be encrypted. (b) Random
image m(x, y) of RPM r(x, y). Encrypted image e(x, y) for the
rotation angle p = 3/4 (α = 3pi/8): (c) Amplitude information
|e(x, y)|, and (d) Phase information φe(x, y). (e) Amplitude in-
formation of the photon-limited encrypted image |eph(x, y)| with
Np = 10
3, and (f) Real-valued decrypted image fph(x, y).
Figure 2. Intensity output for the nonlinear correlation c(x, y) be-
tween the decrypted image fph(x, y) of figure 1(f) and the original
image f(x, y) of figure 1(a) with k = 0.
(a) f˜(x, y) (b) f˜ph(x, y)
(c) c˜(x, y)
Figure 3. (a) False image f˜(x, y) to be encrypted. (b) New de-
crypted image f˜ph(x, y) from a photon-limited encrypted image
e˜ph(x, y) with Np = 103, and (c) Intensity output for the non-
linear correlation c˜(x, y) between the decrypted image f˜ph(x, y)
of figure 3(b) and the original image f(x, y) of figure 1(a) with
k = 0.
In order to test the discrimination capability of the pro-
posed system, we generate a new decrypted image f˜ph(x, y)
from a false image f˜(x, y). The new encrypted image e˜(x, y)
is obtained from f˜(x, y) using the equation (6) for the ro-
tation angle p = 3/4 (α = 3pi/8). The photon-limited
encrypted image e˜ph(x, y) is computed with Np = 103, and
from this image the decrypted image f˜ph(x, y) is obtained
by using the equation (7) and the appropriate keys (the RPM
h(u, v) and the rotation angle α of the GT). The false im-
age f˜(x, y) and the decrypted image f˜ph(x, y) are shown
in figures 3(a) and 3(b). The decrypted image f˜ph(x, y) of
figure 3(b) is very similar to the decrypted image fph(x, y)
of figure 1(f) with a noisy appearance that does not permit
to make out the original text.
We compare f˜ph(x, y) with the original image f(x, y)
using the equation 8 (nonlinear correlation) with k = 0 to
verify its authenticity. The obtained intensity output for the
nonlinear correlation c˜(x, y) is depicted in figure 3(c). For
this case, only a noisy background is obtained without any
remarkable correlation peak. Thus, it is possible to reject the
analyzed image and consider it as a false image.
When an incorrect rotation angle α of the GT or an incor-
rect RPM h(u, v) or both at the same time are used in the
decryption system, the obtained decrypted images fph(x, y)
are still noisy patterns very similar to figures 1(f) and 3(b)
and the obtained intensity output for the nonlinear correla-
tions c(x, y) between fph(x, y) and f(x, y) are noisy back-
ground without any sharp peak, similarly to the output plane
shown in figure 3(c). These results prove that all the keys of
the encryption system are required in the decryption stage for
the correct authentication of the decrypted image fph(x, y).
5. Evaluation of the PCE metric
We use the PCE metric in this section with the purpose of
evaluating the verification capability of the proposed system.
The PCE metric, defined as the ratio between the maximum
intensity peak value of the correlation and the total energy of
the output correlation plane, usually indicates the sharpness
and height of the output correlation peak [11]. The PCE
metric can be defined as
PCE =
ACph∫ |c(x, y)|2 dxdy , (9)
where the parameter ACph represents the maximum inten-
sity peak value of the nonlinear correlation between the
decrypted image fph(x, y) and the original image f(x, y).
The PCE metric is evaluated for different values of the num-
ber of photonsNp, the nonlinearities k and the rotation angle
α of the GT.
We show the results for the PCE metric in figure 4(a)
when the PhCT is integrated with the DRPE system in the
FD [7]. The equations (6) and (7) of the DRPE system for
encryption and decryption in the GD can be converted into
a DRPE in the FD when the GTs of rotation angles α and
−α are replaced by the direct and inverse Fourier transform,
respectively. In figure 4(a), the PCE values rapidly decrease
with the number of photons, particularly when Np is less
than 106.5. The values of k between 0.2 and 0.4 give the
best results in terms of PCE when Np is less than 105.
Figures 4(b) and 4(c) present the PCE results for the
proposed integration of the PhCT with the DRPE in the
GD for the rotation angles p = 0.5 (α = pi/4) and
p = 1 (α = pi/2), respectively. The rotation angles
p = 0 (α = 0) and p = 2 (α = pi) were unused in the
DRPE system in the GD because the results of the GT with
these rotation angles for the original image are the same or
an inverted original images, respectively, and the encrypted
images are not random images. When the PCE is evaluated
for a rotation angle p different from 0, 0.5, 1, 2 and 3, the
PCE curves obtained are very similar to the curves presented
in figure 4(b). The PCE curves obtained for the rotation
angle p = 3 (α = 3pi/2) are very similar to the curves
presented in figure 4(c).
If we compare the results of figures 4(a) and 4(b), we can
see that the results of the PCE metric are very similar. On
the other hand, the results of the PCE metric from figure 4(c)
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Figure 4. PCE values versus number of photons Np and different
nonlinearities k for the integration of the PhCT with the DRPE
system in: (a) the FD, (b) the GD for the rotation angle p =
0.5 (α = pi/4), and (c) the GD for the rotation angle p = 1 (α =
pi/2).
with the rotation angles p = 1 or p = 3 are improved in com-
parison with the results of the PCE presented in figure 4(a),
for the nonlinearities k between 0 and 0.4 and the number of
photons Np > 104.5. The improvement on the PCE values
corresponds to a better verification capability of the authen-
tication system. We recall that the rotation angles p = 1 and
p = 3 of the GT correspond to the direct and inverse Fourier
transforms with rotation of the coordinate at pi/2. Therefore,
the PCE values can be improved when the rotation angles
of the GT are equal to p = 1 or p = 3 for the integration
of the PhCT with the DRPE system in comparison with the
PCE values obtained in the integration of the PhCT with the
DRPE in the FD.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented the integration of the
PhCT with the DRPE in the GD for secure image authenti-
cation. We obtained a sparse encrypted image using the GT,
DRPE and the PhCT applied to the encrypted image. The
decrypted image was a noisy-like code that it is not intended
for visualization; this image was utilized for a successful
verification of an original image used as a reference pattern
by means of a nonlinear correlation technique. The rotation
angle of the GT has improved both the security of the en-
cryption system and the PCE metric of the authentication
system. The security of the encryption system was improved
because a new key, corresponding to the rotation angle of the
GT, has been introduced in the DRPE system in comparison
with the same encryption system in the FD. The PCE metric
of the authentication system was also improved using the
rotation angles p = 1 (α = pi/2) and p = 3 (α = 3pi/2) for
the GTs employed in the DRPE system for encryption and
decryption.
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